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　Both the European Union institutions and Member States agree on the necessity to reform 
once again the institutional architecture and the decision-making procedures of the enlarged 
European Union. Indeed, the last reforms introduced by the Treaty of Nice have been 
insufficient in guaranteeing an efficient and democratic operation of the EU institutions after 
five enlargements and the accession of 21 new Member States since the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957. In fact, these successive reforms prove that the European Union integration is a 
continuous process（I）. In this perspective, the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon will 
drastically strengthen the present EU constitutional framework（II）. 
A CONINUOUS REFORM PROCESS
　Actually, the first institutional reforms undertaken have indisputably reinforced the 
democratic character of the Union. Amongst a plethora of examples are the elections of the 
European Parliament held by direct universal suffrage and the strengthening of its legislative 
role and budgetary powers; the integration of the Court of Auditors within the institutional 
structure; or the recognition of the political responsibility of the European Commission. 
However, these reforms have proven insufficient as the challenges of enlargement are 
always pending and the European Union will still widen, around 2011, after the accession of 
the Croatia and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. The Member States have 
been fully conscious of their stakes for several years, and the reform of the institutions has 
appeared amongst the principal objectives at the Intergovernmental Conferences which have 
prepared, for almost fifteen years, the Treaties of Amsterdam, of Nice and of Lisbon. As an 
extension to the conclusions of the Councils of Brussels, Lisbon and Copenhagen, the European 
Council, which met in Cannes on June 26th and 27th, 1995, has already stressed that due to the 
perspective of enlargement, the following institutional questions should be resolved: “the voting 
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weight, the extension of the scope of decisions adopted by a qualified majority, the number 
of commissioners appointed by all Member States, and all other measures judged necessary 
to ease the tasks of the institutions and to guarantee their efficiency in the perspective of 
enlargement.” 
The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Prospect of the Enlargement
　But for lack of a sufficient political agreement between negotiators, the Treaty of Amsterdam 
was not able to respond to these demands. However, its Protocol n°7 on the institutions with 
the prospect of enlargement of the European Union imposed several legal obligations. Thus 
in accordance with article 1, “At the date of entry into force of the first enlargement, the 
Commission shall comprise one national of each of the Member States, provided that, by that 
date, the weighting of the votes in the Council has been modified, whether by re-weighting of 
the votes or by dual majority, in a manner acceptable to all Member States, taking into account 
all relevant elements, notably compensating those Member States which give up the possibility 
of nominating a second member of the Commission.” What’s more, article 2 specifies that: “At 
least one year before the membership of the European Union exceeds twenty, a conference 
of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened in order to 
carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on the composition and 
functioning of the institutions.” 
The Necessary but Limited Results of the Treaty of Nice
　According to the Protocol n°7, a  new  Intergovernmental  Conference（ICG）concluded its 
work on December 11th, 2000 in Nice with an agreement on the institutional issues which 
had not been settled in Amsterdam. On January 2001, this political agreement was legally 
translated with the signature of the Nice Treaty. It concerned: the distribution of seats in the 
European Parliament, the composition of the Commission and the definition of the qualified 
majority within the Council. Lastly, the principles and methods for the enlargement were listed 
in the protocol n°1 on enlargement and attached declarations, particularly the declaration n°23 
on the enlargement of the European Union1. 
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1 Declaration n°23 on the future of the Union: 
１．Important reforms have been decided in Nice. The Conference welcomes the successful conclusion 
of the Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States and commits the 
Member States to pursue the early ratification of the Treaty of Nice.
２．It agrees that the conclusion of the Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States opens the way for enlargement of the European Union and underlines that, with 
ratification of the Treaty of Nice, the European Union will have completed the institutional changes 
necessary for the accession of new Member States.
３．Having thus opened the way to enlargement, the Conference calls for a deeper and wider debate 
about the future of the European Union. In 2001, the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies, in 
cooperation with the Commission and involving the European Parliament, will encourage wide-
ranging discussions with all interested parties: representatives of national parliaments and all those 
reflecting public opinion, namely political, economic and university circles, representatives of civil 
society, etc. The candidate States will be associated with this process in ways to be defined.
４．Following a report to be drawn up for the European Council in Göteborg in June 2001, the 
European Council, at its meeting in Laeken/Brussels in December 2001, will agree on a declaration 
containing appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process.
５．The process should address, inter alia, the following questions:
　　− how to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union 
and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity;
　　− the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice, in 
accordance with the conclusions of the European Council in Cologne;
　　− a simplification of the Treaties with a view to making them clearer and better understood without 
changing their meaning; 
　　− the role of national parliaments in the European architecture.
６ . Addressing the abovementioned issues, the Conference recognises the need to improve and to 
monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union and its institutions, in order to 
bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States.
７．After these preparatory steps, the Conference agrees that a new Conference of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States will be convened in 2004, to address 
the abovementioned items with a view to making corresponding changes to the Treaties.
８．The Conference of Member States shall not constitute any form of obstacle or pre-condition 
to the enlargement process. Moreover, those candidate States which have concluded accession 
negotiations with the Union will be invited to participate in the Conference. Those candidate States 
which have not concluded their accession negotiations will be invited as observers. 
　Of course, the declaration n°23 underlines “that, with ratification of the Treaty of Nice, the 
European Union will have completed the institutional changes necessary for the accession of 
new Member States” but it also calls “for a deeper and wider debate about the future of the 
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European Union.” Thus, “the process should address, inter  alia , the following questions: how 
to establish and monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the European Union 
and the Member States, reflecting the principle of subsidiarity; the status of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice（…）; a simplification of the Treaties 
with a view to making them clearer and better understood without changing their meaning; 
the role of national parliaments in the European architecture. Moreover, “the Conference 
recognises the need to improve and to monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency 
of the Union and its institutions, in order to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member 
States”. Finally, “the Conference agrees that a new Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States will be convened in 2004, to address the abovementioned 
items with a view to making corresponding changes to the Treaties.” 
　According to point 8  of  the  declaration n°23,  the  candidate States which have concluded 
accession negotiations with the Union have been invited to participate in the new Conference 
and the other candidate States, such as Turkey, have been invited as observers. On the basis of 
the works of the “Convention for Europe”, chaired by M. Valery Giscard d’Estaing, the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome on October 29th 2004 but, because of 
the French and the Dutch refusals, it has never been implemented. 
The Modifications introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon
　After the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the French and the Dutch people, the 
Lisbon Treaty constitutes a compromise which all Heads of State or Government agreed to 
in the Portuguese capital on October 18th and 19th, 2007. The last “European Constitution” 
suggested the repeal of all of the present treaties to replace them by one text only but the 
Lisbon Treaty has been limited to the modification of the existing treaties. 
　Thus, the Lisbon Treaty bears the key following clauses:
　 • the Union becomes a legal entity. This implies notably to be part of an international 
convention or be a member of an international organisation; 
　 • the three pillars are merged together; 
　 • the Charter of Fundamental Rights will be legally binding and the EU will accede to the 
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European Convention for the Protection of the Human Rights, 
Legal Framework of the Current Treaty on the EU with the 3 Pillars and of the Modified Treaty on the EU
           
　 • the sharing of competences between the EU and the Member State is specified
　 • a stable presidency of the European Council, for a duration of 2 and a half years, renewable 
once;
　 • affirmation of the co-decision rule between the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers as the ordinary legislative procedure;
　 • a new rule of double majority is introduced;
　 • creation of the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”;
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2 CJEC, 23 April 1986, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament , Case n°294/83, Report  1986, 
p. 1339. 
　 • reduction of the size of the European Commission to less than one commissioner per 
Member State with a rotation system;
　 • engagement of the National Parliaments by expanding scrutiny-time of EU legislation and 
by enabling them to jointly compel the Commission to review or withdrawn legislative 
acts; 
　 • right of citizens’ initiative to be considered by the European Commission if signed by 1 
million citizens;
　 • creation of an EU public prosecutor; 
　 • common defence foreseen; 
　 • Membership withdrawal clause;
　 • combating climate change explicitly stated as an objective;
　 • further enlargements are enabled by removing the Nice treaty limitation to 27 Member 
States… 
　For political reasons, in order to limited new ratification procedures by referenda, the Lisbon 
treaty is no longer called the “European constitution” but “Reform” or “Modifying treaty”. This 
change, which essentially appears to be a formal one, also provides a response to requests 
made by certain countries such as the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and the UK, who 
believed, during negotiations, that the constitutional symbols should be abandoned, that is to 
say the terms “Constitution”, “European Foreign Affairs Minister” “laws” and “framework 
laws” as well as the references to the Union symbols: flag, anthem, motto… Nevertheless, the 
High Representative for Foreign affairs keeps the same competences as the Foreign Affairs 
Minister, the European laws and the European frameworks laws are called legislative acts and 
the European flag, anthem and motto will still exist! 
　Thus, if the Reform Treaty is no longer called the “constitution” of the EU, it still emerges 
from the “Les Verts ” judgement taken April 23rd 1986 that “the European Economic 
Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States 
nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them 
are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty”2. Legally speaking, the 
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EU is not a classical international organisation and its institutional framework is based on 
constitutional principles: it distinguishes the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers 
and it is based on the rule of law and the protection of the Human rights. Now, these principles 
are confirmed and strengthen by the modified EU Treaty. 
THE STRENGTHENING OF THE EU CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
　In accordance with democratic principles outlined in the initial treaties, Member States are 
legally equal and, as such, participate in the activities of the institutions of the Community. 
These principles have two structural consequences. Firstly, all the institutions have at least one 
citizen from each Member State. Secondly, with the exception of the European Council and of 
the Council, the other institutions adopt the majority of the decisions by a simple majority, the 
votes of each member having the same weight. To avoid misrepresentation, the implementation 
of these deep-rooted principles must be fundamentally redefined, not only concerning the 
weighting of votes in the Council’s deliberations, but also the establishment of the number of 
Commissioners and of Members of the European Parliament （MEPs）. In accordance to the 
Treaty of Nice, Malta, whose number of inhabitants amounts to less than half a million, disposes 
of three votes for elections held in the Council adopted by a qualified majority, six Members of 
the European Parliament, as well as one Commissioner, one Judge at the Court of Justice and 
one Member at the Court of Auditors. But Germany, whose number of inhabitants amounts to 
eighty two million, disposes of twenty nine votes for elections held in the Council adopted by a 
qualified majority, ninety six Members of the European Parliament, and one Commissioner, one 
Judge at the Court of Justice and one Member at the Court of Auditors. 
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Constitutional Framework of the EU
　The merit of this comparison is that it emphasizes the urgency to reform the institutions of 
the Community as they oppose the principles of legitimatization and representativeness and 
would result in their paralysis. At least, it supposes to strengthen the Parliament, to modify 
the qualified majority in the Council and to reduce the size of the European Commission. 
On December 13th 2007, the European Council signed the Treaty of Lisbon, thus bringing to 
an expected end several years of negotiation about institutional issues. Thus, a comparative 
approach will firstly try to emphasize the current limits and inadequacies of the EU institutions 
in order to enlighten the key reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Concerning the 
decision making-process, they respectively concern the European Council in charge of the 
political impulse and the triangle of decision-making, that is to say: the Council of the EU, the 
European Parliament and the European Commission. Otherwise, the Treaty of Lisbon will 
particularly institute the High Representative for Foreign affairs and security policy. 
The European Council and its Presidency
　The European Council represents the Heads of State or Government of the Member States 
of the EU. Its first goal is to give the political impulse to the EU policies and to define the 
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major orientations. Nevertheless, each Member State chairs the EU on a six-month rotation 
system and this situation undermines the efficiency of the work undertaken by the European 
Council. 
　With the Treaty of Lisbon, one of the most important innovations lies in the creation of a 
stable presidency. Like the European Parliament and the Commission, the European Council 
will have a full - time president who will not be able to assume a national mandate. He will be 
elected by a qualified majority by the European Council for two and a half years renewable 
once. The President of the European Council will give a voice and a face to the European 
Union, represent the Union in the international arena and chair and co-ordinate the European 
Council’s work. 
　Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, pursuant to Article 7 of the Treaty on European 
Union, the European Council can declare the existence of a serious and persistent breach 
of fundamental rights. If this occurs, the Council may suspend certain of the rights of the 
country concerned. The Treaty of Nice has supplemented this procedure with a preventive 
instrument. Upon a proposal of one-third of the Member States, the Parliament or the 
Commission, the Council, acting by a four-fifths majority of its members and with the assent 
of the European Parliament, can declare that a clear danger exists of a Member State 
committing a serious breach of fundamental rights and address to this Member State 
appropriate recommendation. The Court of Justice is competent（Article 46 of the Treaty on 
European Union）only for disputes concerning procedural provisions under Article 7, and not 
for the appreciation of the justification or the appropriateness of the decisions taken pursuant 
to this provision. The Treaty of Lisbon globally preserves all this modification. 
Weighting of Vote, Qualified Majority and debates in the Council
　According to the Treaty of Nice, a qualified majority is currently obtained in the Council if: 
　 • the decision is approved by a majority of Member States and 
　 • the decision receives at least a specified number of votes so called “the qualified majority 
threshold.” 
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　This qualified majority threshold was at the centre of debates during the closing stages of 
the ICG.  In the Union of 27 Member  States, it has been fixed to  73.91%  of  the votes, which 
means 255 voices for a total of 345. Moreover, the Treaty also provides for the possibility for 
a member of the Council to request verification that the qualified majority represents at least 
62% of the total population of the European Union. If this condition is not met, the decision 
will not be adopted. 
　The current system isn’t really efficient because it is too complex and it leads to weaker 
representation of the most populated Member States in favour of States whose population 
figures are lower. Equality between the States, according to the size of their population, 
necessitates an urgent review of voter weight within the Council, without which the qualified 
majority vote would be unable to guarantee the efficiency and the speed of the Council’s work. 
　With the Lisbon Treaty, a double majority will be calculated according to two criteria: 
55% of EU States（ie at 27, 15 Member States）and 65% of the EU’s population. A blocking 
minority has to include at least 4 Member States. The new double majority system will be 
more democratic but also more effective in comparison with the system employed in the Nice 
Treaty since it facilitates the creation of majorities and therefore decisions can be taken. 
　The enhancement of the efficiency of the decision- making process also implies the extension 
of the qualified majority vote, instead of the unanimity, to new areas such as external border 
control, asylum, immigration or measures relative to the reception of asylum seekers and the 
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processing of their case. 
　Furthermore, the Council of Ministers will meet in public when a “legislative act” will be 
debated and approved which heralds a move towards the democratisation of the European 
Union. The citizens will be informed about debates that are taking place within the Council. 
Composition and Competences of the European Parliament
　The treaty of Nice modified the composition of the European Parliament and enlarged its 
competences in order to strengthen its efficiency. The Treaty of Lisbon pursues these reforms. 
Looking ahead to a Union of 27 Member States, the Treaty of Nice has introduced a maximum 
of 736 MPs seats in the European Parliament and a new distribution per State. The Treaty of 
Lisbon imposes to reduce this number to 751 but it wasn’t ratified before June 2009 and the 
Treaty of Nice is still implemented. 
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　With the Treaty of Nice, the article 191 of the EC Treaty has been supplemented by a 
legal base which allows the adoption via the co-decision procedure of a statute of European 
level political parties and particularly of rules concerning their funding. This statute was 
adopted in 2005 and gives a new legitimacy to the political groups represented in the European 
Parliament. For the European elections in June 2009, in order to stimulate the European 
citizens, these European political parties should have been able to propose European political 
programs and to specify the name of their candidate for the presidency of the European 
Commission. Unfortunately, they didn’t do it… 
　The regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the duties of members 
of the European Parliament have also been approved by the Council by a qualified majority, 
with the exception of the provisions relating to taxation（Article 190 of the EC Treaty）. The 
European Parliament is henceforth able, in the same way as the Council, the Commission and 
the Member States, to institute proceedings to have acts of the institutions to be declared void 
without having to demonstrate specific concern（Article 230 of the EC Treaty）and to seek 
a prior opinion from the Court of Justice on the compatibility of an international agreement 
with the Treaty（Article 300.6 of the EC Treaty）. 
　With the Treaty of Nice, the responsibilities of the European Parliament have still been 
extended by expanding the scope of the co-decision for seven provisions which change over 
from unanimity to qualified majority voting: articles 13, 62, 63, 65, 157, 159 and 191 of the EC 
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Treaty. Moreover, the Parliament’s assent is required to establish enhanced cooperation in an 
area covered by the codecision process. The ICG has not, however, extended the co-decision 
procedure to legislative measures which already come under the qualified majority rule（e.g. 
in agricultural policy or trade policy）. At least, the European Parliament is also called upon 
to state its opinion when the Council intends to declare that a clear danger exists of a serious 
breach of fundamental rights occurring. 
　With the Treaty of Lisbon, the powers of the Parliament are still strengthened in terms of 
legislation, budget and also political control. The co-decision, called the “ordinary legislative 
procedure” is expanded for 27 provisions such as the internal market, the commercial 
agreements, the agricultural policy… 
　The Parliament swears in the President of the Commission on the proposal of the European 
Council, “taking the European Parliament elections into account.” At first, this reform lends the 
President of the Commission greater democratic legitimacy, which is of major importance in an 
institution often seen as being “disconnected” from its citizens. Secondly, it makes it possible to 
politicize the European elections and undoubtedly raise the interest levels of European voters 
whose vote will then have European political life sway over. 
The size of the European Commission
　In the decision-making process, the European Commission has a central role with the entire 
monopoly over the initiative to legislate. Thus, the reduction of its size is a major issue in order 
to guarantee its efficiency with an enlarged European Union. 
　Since November1st 2004, in accordance to the Nice Treaty, the Commission has comprised 
one national per Member State. The biggest Member States thus lost at that time the 
opportunity of proposing a second member of the Commission. From November 1st 2014, or 
possibly November 2017, the number of Commissioners will correspond to two-thirds of the 
Member States （i.e 18 in a Union comprising 27 Member States）. The Commissioners will 
be selected by a system of rotation that will be fair to all countries and that satisfactorily 
reflects the different demographic and geographic characteristics of the Member States. The 
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Treaty of Nice has also changed the procedure for nominating the Commission （Art. 214 of 
the EC Treaty）. Henceforth, the nomination of the President is a matter for the European 
Council acting by a qualified majority. This appointment must be approved by the European 
Parliament. With the Lisbon Treaty, the choice will take “the European Parliament elections 
into account.” 
　Thereafter, the Council, acting by a qualified majority and in agreement with the appointed 
president, adopts the list of the other people it intends to appoint as members of the 
Commission, drawn up in accordance with the proposals made by each Member State. Lastly, 
the president and the members of the Commission will be appointed by the Council acting by 
a qualified majority after approval of the body of Commissioners by the European Parliament. 
At least, the new wording of Article 217 of the EC Treaty increases the President’s powers. 
He decides as to the internal organisation of the Commission, allocates portfolios to the 
Commissioners and, if necessary, reassigns responsibilities during his term of office; he also 
appoints, after the collective approval of the body, the vice-presidents, whose number is no 
longer established in the Treaty; he may demand a commissioner’s resignation, subject to the 
Commission’s approval. 
Institution of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
　Otherwise, the Lisbon Treaty sets up a High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. The present functions of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Mr Javier Solana, and of the European Commissioner 
for external relations, Ms. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, will be merged together. This provides 
greater coherence and unity to the European Union’s external action. Appointed by the 
European Council and sworn in by the European Parliament he/she will be Vice-President 
of the European Commission and will chair the Foreign Affairs Council at the Council of 
Ministers. 
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* * *
　A lot of other issues are undermining the efficiency of the EU. For example, the language 
issue is just as sensitive. The article 21 of the EC Treaty lays out that: “Every citizen of 
the Union may write to any of the institutions or bodies（of the EU）in one of the（official）
languages （…）and have an answer in the same language.” Thus, the Union works with twenty-
three official languages! With regards to the cost of interpretation and translation of Community 
documents, indeed to the limited numbers of qualified staff, the institutions of the Union 
should come to an agreement on a political procedure in order to define a realistic linguistic 
system concerning the various levels of work in these areas. A pragmatic decision would be 
particularly adapted to political communications and the internal preparation of decisions made 
by the Union. 
　Confronted to the global economic and financial crisis and the conflictual relationships with 
Russia, the future of the Union, of European citizenship and of democracy on the Old Continent 
cannot wait for the definition of a major political project any longer or for the adoption of an 
adequate institutional architecture. The responsibility is huge and cannot simply be delegated 
to the governing class… The upcoming implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon here has an 
essential significance: it is a privileged opportunity to lay the foundations of a genuine European 
political society guaranteeing the citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights. This 
European political society constitutes an essential preliminary before adopting a Constitution 
for the European Union. 
